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Abstract
We develop a theory of imperfect competition with loss-averse consumers. All con-
sumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their
purchasing decision. However, a share of consumers are initially uncertain about
their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and
an expected price distribution, while other consumers are perfectly informed all the
time. We derive pricing implications in duopoly with asymmetric firms. In partic-
ular, we show that a market may exhibit more price variation the larger the share
of uninformed, loss-averse consumers. We also derive implications for firm strat-
egy and public policy concerning firms’ incentives to inform consumers about their
match value prior to forming their reference point.
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1 Introduction
Consumer information about price and match value of products is a key determinant of
market outcomes. Previous work has emphasized the role of consumer information at
the moment of purchase.1 If consumers are loss-averse, information prior to the moment
of purchase matters: Product information plays an important role at the stage at which
loss-averse consumers form expectations about future transactions.
In this paper, we develop a theory of imperfect competition to investigate the competi-
tive effects of consumer loss aversion. Our theory applies to inspection goods, with the
feature that consumers readily observe prices in the market but have to inspect products
before knowing the match value—i.e., the fit between product characteristics and con-
sumer tastes. As we argue below, this applies to a number of product categories and, thus,
is important for understanding market interaction.
Loss aversion in consumer choice has been widely documented in a variety of laboratory
and field settings, starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Loss-averse consumers
have to form expectations about product performance. Following Koszegi and Rabin
(2006), we postulate that, to make their consumption choices, loss-averse consumers form
their probabilistic reference point based on expected future transactions, which are con-
firmed in equilibrium. Here, a consumer’s reference point is her probabilistic belief about
the relevant consumption outcome held between the time she first focuses on the deci-
sion determining the consumption plan—i.e., when she heard about the products, was
informed about the prices for the products on offer, and formed her expectations—and the
moment she actually makes the purchase.2
We distinguish between “informed” and “uninformed” consumers at the moment con-
sumers form their reference point. Informed consumers know their taste ex ante and will
perfectly foresee their equilibrium utility from product characteristics. Therefore, they
will not face a loss or gain in product satisfaction beyond their intrinsic valuation.
Uninformed consumers, by contrast, are uncertain about their ideal product characteristic:
They form expectations about the difference between ideal and actual product characteris-
tic which will serve as a reference point when evaluating a product along its match value
1See, e.g., Varian (1980), Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004), and Armstrong and Chen (2009).
2For evidence that expectation-based counterfactuals can affect the individual’s reaction to outcomes, see
Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd (1998), Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995), and Mellers, Schwartz,
and Ritov (1999). Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and Koszegi and Rabin (2007) have developed the general
theory of expectation-based reference points and the notion of personal equilibrium.
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dimension. They will also face a gain or a loss relative to their expected distributions
of price after learning the taste realization. Since all consumers become fully informed
before making their purchasing decision, we isolate the effect of consumer loss aversion
on consumption choices and abstract from the effects of differential information at the
moment of purchase.3
Consumers are loss-averse with respect to prices and match value and have rational ex-
pectations about equilibrium outcomes to form their reference point, as in Heidhues and
Koszegi (2008). Firms are possibly asymmetric due to deterministic cost differences—
this is common knowledge among the firms when the game starts.4 They compete in
prices for differentiated products. Consumers observe equilibrium prices before forming
their reference point. Thus, firms can use price as an expectation-management tool. If
firms set different prices, uninformed consumers will face either a loss or a gain in the
price dimension, depending on whether they buy the more- or less-expensive product.
Hence, an (ex ante) uninformed consumer’s realized net utility depends not only on the
price of the product she buys, but also on the price of the product she does not buy.
A key modeling assumption is that a share of consumers are initially uninformed. These
consumers form expectations before knowing their match value attributed to a particular
product, but after learning the prices of the products. This timing with respect to informa-
tion release and reference point formation appears to be the appropriate modeling choice.
This is true, in particular, if price information is provided at the moment consumers be-
come aware of the existence of products, but in which match value is difficult to evaluate
without closer inspection.
Let us provide some examples. First, prices of clothing and electronic devices are easily
accessible (and are often advertised) in advance while, for inexperienced consumers, the
match quality between product and personal tastes is impossible or difficult to evaluate
before actually seeing or touching the product. A related example is high-end stereo
equipment, including speakers. Price tags are immediately observed, but it may take
several visits to the shop (on appointment) or even trials at home to figure out the match
value of the different products under consideration—for example, because people differ
with respect to the sound they like and how the system sounds in their home.5
3Our model can be interpreted alternatively as one in which consumers know their ideal taste ex ante,
but are exposed to uncertainty about product characteristics when they form their reference point.
4In the extension section, we show that our analysis can also be applied to products of different qualities.
5Note that in this market segment the retailer typically charges the recommended retail price. Thus,
equipment makers effectively set the retail price.
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Second, price information on products sold over the internet—for example, digital cam-
eras or CDs of a particular classical concert—is immediately available, while match value
is often determined only after listening to some of the material provided online or af-
ter studying the product details on the product’s web page. Finally, competing services
such as long-distance bus rides and flights are differentiated by departure times. Here,
consumers are perfectly aware of the product characteristics ex ante—i.e., price and de-
parture time—but learn their preference concerning their ideal point of departure only at
some later stage (after forming their probabilistic reference point, but before purchase).
In this paper, we focus on implications of consumer loss aversion on pricing strategies
and information disclosure. Our companion paper, Karle and Peitz (2009), provides a
detailed account of competitive effects in symmetric oligopoly.
Our first main result is that, in asymmetric markets (and with equal weights assigned to
the price and the match value dimension), price variation is larger than in a market without
loss-averse consumers (or, equivalently, only ex ante informed consumers).
Our second main result is that, in asymmetric markets, loss aversion—or, more precisely,
the presence of more ex ante uninformed, loss-averse consumers—may lead to lower
prices. Hence, the standard result that more informed consumers (or more consumers
without a behavioral bias) lead to lower prices is challenged in our model when firms
are strongly asymmetric, while it holds in symmetric and moderately asymmetric mar-
kets. The driving force behind this result is that loss aversion in the price dimension
has a pro-competitive effect, while the effect of loss aversion in the taste dimension is
anti-competitive. The pro-competitive effect dominates the anti-competitive effect if the
size of loss aversion in the price dimension becomes sufficiently large—this is caused by
strong cost asymmetries. In those markets, uninformed consumers are reluctant to buy
the expensive product and, instead, accept a large reduction in match value when buying
the low-price product.
Our paper contributes to the understanding of the effect of consumer loss aversion in mar-
ket environments and is complementary to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) and Karle and
Peitz (2009).6 Also, Zhou (2008) considers competitive effects in a model with consumer
loss aversion. However, in his paper, consumers do not base reference points on expec-
tations but on past choices. A contribution of our paper is to show that consumer loss
aversion increases competition, compared to a setting in which consumers are not sub-
ject to this behavioral bias, in strongly asymmetric markets and relaxes it in moderately
asymmetric markets.
6Our companion paper considers a generalized oligopoly model that abstracts from market asymmetries.
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In our modeling effort, we followed Heidhues and Koszegi (2008). Our framework, how-
ever, has notable differences to theirs: First, consumers and firms know the market en-
vironment; in particular, firms know the actual (asymmetric) cost realizations, whereas
in Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), costs are private information. Second, consumers learn
posted prices before they form their reference points, whereas in Heidhues and Koszegi
(2008), consumers form their reference points before knowing posted prices. Thus, in
contrast to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), in our model, firms can use price to manage
consumer expectations. In addition, our model delivers unique equilibrium predictions.
Our model is enriched by considering heterogeneous consumers who differ according to
their knowledge of their preferences when they form their (probabilistic) reference point.
Our model delivers novel results. In particular, we show that the price difference between
the two products increases in the share of uninformed loss-averse consumers, while Hei-
dhues and Koszegi (2008) obtained focal pricing as a consequence of the presence of loss
aversion in the population. In other words, in our setting, the behavioral bias increases the
observed price difference, whereas in Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), the price variation
between asymmetric firms disappears.7
More broadly, our paper contributes to the analysis of behavioral biases in market settings,
as in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and Grubb (2009). An
important issue in our paper, as in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), is the comparative statics
effects in the composition of the population. In their model this composition effect is
behavioral in the sense that the share of consumers with a behavioral bias changes. We do
not need to resort to this interpretation, although our analysis is compatible with it: We
allow the composition effect to be informational in the sense that the arrival of information
in the consumer population is changed (while the whole population is subject to the same
behavioral bias).
The informational interpretation lends itself naturally to addressing questions about the ef-
fect of early information disclosure to additional consumers. We analyze information dis-
closure policies by firms and public authorities in the context of our behavioral industrial-
organization framework. Thus, we demonstrate the possible use of behavioral models to
7Recent empirical work that tracks prices of a large set of products over time in the U.S. economy
finds that firms frequently change prices and that price changes are usually big in absolute terms, although
many are much smaller; even for individual items, price durations and absolute price changes were found
to vary considerably over time (see Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)). We conclude from this that Heidhues
and Koszegi’s (2008) theoretical explanation of price stickiness conflicts with observed pricing behavior for
a broad set of products. In particular, small price changes as a result of small cost changes are difficult to
reconcile with the focal price argument in Heidhues and Koszegi (2008). By contrast, our framework with
loss-averse consumers does not feature price stickiness when embedded in a dynamic model in which costs
are newly drawn each period.
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address policy questions in industrial organization. As stated above, our model has the
feature that, absent a behavioral bias, information disclosure policies are meaningless.
Thus, to address these issues, the behavioral bias is essential to our model. In particular,
we show that private and social incentives to disclose information at an early stage are not
aligned. We also show that the more efficient (and, thus, larger) firm discloses information
if firms have conflicting interests.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on the economics of advertising (see Bagwell
(2007) for an excellent survey). It uncovers the role of advertising as consumer expec-
tation management. Note that at the point of purchase, consumers are fully informed,
so that there is no role for informative advertising. However, since consumers are loss-
averse, informing consumers about their match value makes these consumers informed
in our terminology. Advertising, thus, can remove the uncertainty consumers face when
forming their reference point. This form of advertising can be seen as a hybrid form
of informative and persuasive advertising because it changes preferences at the point of
purchase—this corresponds to the persuasive view of advertising—albeit due to informa-
tion that is received ex ante—this corresponds to the informative view of advertising. It
also points to the importance of the timing of advertising: For expectation management,
it is important to inform consumers early on.8
Our paper also complements the work on consumer search in product markets (see, e.g.,
Varian (1980), Anderson and Renault (2000), Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004), Arm-
strong and Chen (2009)). Whereas that literature focuses on the effect of differential in-
formation (and consumer search) at the purchasing stage, our paper abstracts from this
issue and focuses on the effect of differential information at the expectation-formation
stage which is relevant if consumers are loss-averse. Finally, our paper complements the
large literature on imperfect competition in differentiated product markets by analyzing
the competitive effects of consumer loss aversion.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. Here, we deter-
mine the demand of uninformed consumers. In Section 3, we characterize the duopoly
equilibrium. In the accompanying Appendix B, we establish equilibrium uniqueness and
equilibrium existence. Our existence proof requires us to bound the parameters of our
8Other marketing activities can also be understood as making consumers informed at the stage when
they form their reference point. For instance, test drives for cars or lending out furniture, stereo equipment,
and the like make consumers informed early on. Arguably, in reality, uncertainty may not be fully resolved
even at the purchasing stage. However, to focus our minds, we only consider the role of marketing activities
on expectation formation before purchase. In short, in our model firms may use marketing to manage
expectations of loss-averse consumers at an early stage. For a complementary view, see Bar-Isaac, Caruana,
and Cunat (2010).
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model—in particular, the two firms cannot be too asymmetric for equilibrium existence
to hold. In section 4, we analyze the impact of the degree of cost asymmetry on equilib-
rium outcomes. In Section 5, we establish comparative statics results with respect to the
share of ex ante informed consumers. In Section 6, we provide two model extensions: We
allow for different weights in the gain-loss utility and for different product qualities. Sec-
tion 7 concludes. Most of the proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Results on equilibrium
existence and uniqueness are provided in Appendix B. Additional tables with numerical
results are contained in Appendix C.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a market with two, possibly asymmetric firms, A and B, and a continuum of loss-
averse consumers of mass 1. Firm i = A, B incurs a constant marginal cost of production
ci. The firms’ asymmetry consists of a difference in the marginal cost of production. The
more efficient firm is labeled to be firm A—i.e., cA ≤ cB. Firms are located on a circle of
length 2 with maximum distance, yA = 0, yB = 1. Firms announce prices pA and pB to all
consumers.
Consumers of mass one are uniformly distributed on the circle of length 2. A consumer’s
location x, x ∈ [0, 2), represents her taste parameter. Her taste is initially—i.e., before she
forms her reference point—known only to herself if she belongs to the set of informed
consumers.
In our model, consumers’ differential information applies to the date at which consumers
determine their reference point and not to the date of purchase: A fraction (1 − β) of
loss-averse consumers, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is initially uninformed about their taste. As will be de-
tailed below, they endogenously determine their reference point and then, before making
their purchasing decision, observe their taste parameter (which is private information of
each consumer). At the moment of purchase all consumers are perfectly informed about
product characteristics, prices, and tastes.
All consumers have the same reservation value v for an ideal variety and have unit de-
mand. Their utility from not buying is −∞ so that the market is fully covered.
A remark about our modeling choice is in order: We could alternatively work with the
Hotelling line. Our circle model is, in terms of market outcomes, equivalent to the
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Hotelling model in which consumers are uniformly distributed on the [0, 1]-interval and
firms are located at the extreme points of the interval. However, the circle model al-
lows for an alternative and equivalent interpretation about the type of information some
consumers initially lack: At the point in time consumers form their reference point distri-
bution, they all know their taste parameters, but only a fraction (1 − β) does not know the
location of the high- and the low-cost firm. These uninformed consumers only know that
the two firms are located at maximal distance and that one is a high- whereas the other is
a low-cost firm.
To determine the market demand faced by the two firms, let the informed consumer type
in [0, 1], who is indifferent between buying good A and good B, be denoted by xˆin(pA, pB).
Correspondingly, the indifferent uninformed consumer is denoted by xˆun(pA, pB). Since
market shares on [0, 1] and [1, 2] are symmetric, the firms’ profits are:
πA(pA, pB) = (pA − cA)[β · xˆin(pA, pB) + (1 − β) · xˆun(pA, pB)]
πB(pA, pB) = (pB − cB)[β · (1 − xˆin(pA, pB)) + (1 − β) · (1 − xˆun(pA, pB))].
The timing of events is as follows. Before the game starts marginal costs (cA, cB) realize
and become common knowledge among firms.9
Stage 1.) Price setting stage: Firms simultaneously set prices (pA, pB).
Stage 2.) Reference point formation stage: All consumers observe prices and
a) informed consumers observe their taste x (for them uncertainty is resolved),
b) uninformed consumers form reference point distributions over purchase price
and match value (as detailed in Subsection 2.3 below.)
Stage 3.) Inspection stage: Uninformed consumers observe their taste x—i.e., uncertainty is
resolved for all consumers.
Stage 4.) Purchasing stage: Consumers decide which product to buy:
a) Informed consumers make rational purchase decisions;
b) (ex ante) uninformed consumers make rational purchase decisions, based on
their utility that includes realized gains and losses relative to their reference
point distribution.
9As mentioned above, without loss of generality, we consider realizations cA ≤ cB.
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We solve for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where firms foresee that uninformed con-
sumers play a personal equilibrium at stage 2b. Personal equilibrium in our context simply
means that consumers hold rational expectation about their final purchasing decision—for
the general formalization, see Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
2.2 Demand of informed consumers
Informed consumers ex ante observe prices and their taste parameter and, therefore, do
not face any uncertainty when forming their reference point. Hence, their behavior is
the same as in the standard Hotelling-Salop model. For prices pA and pB, an informed
consumer located at x obtains the indirect utility ui(x, pi) = v − t|yi − x| − pi from buying
product i, where t scales the disutility from distance between ideal and actual taste on the
circle. The expression v−t|yi−x| then captures the match value of product i for a consumer
of type x. Denote the indifferent (informed) consumer between buying from firm A and B
on the first half of the circle by xˆin ∈ [0, 1]. The informed indifferent consumer is
xˆin(pA, pB) = (t + pB − pA)2t . (1)
Symmetrically, a second indifferent (informed) consumer type is located at 2−xˆin(pA, pB) ∈
[1, 2]. Without loss of generality, we focus on demand of consumers between 0 and 1 and
multiply by 2. We note that cost differences influence the location of indifferent con-
sumers via prices.10
2.3 Demand of uninformed consumers
Uninformed consumers do not know their ideal taste x ex ante and, thus, are ex ante
uncertain as to which product they will buy after they have learnt their ideal taste x:
They, therefore, face ex ante uncertainty in the price and match value dimension and form
reference point distributions in these two dimensions.
Three properties of consumer behavior are worthwhile pointing out. First, consumers
have gains or losses not about net utilities but about each product “characteristic”, where
price is then treated as a product characteristic. This is in line with much of the exper-
imental evidence on the endowment effect—for a discussion, see, for instance, Koszegi
10E.g., if there are only informed consumers, xˆin = 1/2 + (cB − cA)/(6t) in equilibrium . This is closer to
B for cB > cA: The low-cost firm serves a larger market share.
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and Rabin (2006). Second, consumers evaluate gains and losses across products.11 This
appears to be a natural property for consumers facing a discrete choice problem: They
have to compare the merits of the two products to each other. In other words, consumers
view the purchasing decision with respect to these two problems as a single decision prob-
lem. Third, to reduce the number of parameters, we assume that the gain/loss parameters
are the same across dimensions. This appears to be the natural benchmark—again we
refer to our companion paper, Karle and Peitz (2009), for an analysis under alternative
assumptions.
While our setting is related to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), our model has three dis-
tinguishing features. First, firms’ cost realizations are common knowledge among firms.
This property is in line with a large part of the industrial organization literature on im-
perfect competition and is approximately satisfied in markets in which firms are well-
informed not only about their own costs but also about their relative position in the market.
Second, prices are already set before consumers form their reference point. This property
applies to markets in which consumers are from the start well-informed about the actual
price distribution they face in the market. This holds in markets in which firms inform
consumers about prices (but consumers are initially uncertain about the match value and
thus their eventual purchasing decision) or in which prices are publicly posted.12 Third,
a fraction of (1 − β) of uninformed consumers face uncertainty about their ideal taste x,
whereas a fraction of β informed consumers know their ideal taste ex ante. Various justi-
fications for differential information at the ex ante stage can be given. Consumers differ
by their experience concerning the relevant product feature. Alternatively, a share of con-
sumers know that they will be subject to a taste shock between forming their reference
point and making their purchasing decision. These consumers then do not condition their
reference point on the ex ante taste parameter, whereas those belonging to the remaining
share do.
Consider an uninformed consumer who will learn that she is located at x after her ideal
taste is realized. Suppose firms set prices pA and pB. Then the uninformed consumer will
buy from firm A if she is located close enough to firm A—i.e., if x ∈ [0, xˆun(pA, pB)]∪ [2−
xˆun(pA, pB), 2], where xˆun(pA, pB) is the location of the indifferent (uninformed) consumer
we want to characterize. Hence, the uninformed consumer at x will pay pA in equilibrium
11Gains and losses also matter in the price dimension because, even though prices are deterministic,
they can be different across firms. Hence, a consumer who initially does not know her taste parameter is
uncertain at this point in time about the price at which she will buy.
12This is particularly appropriate in market environments in which price information has been provided
from the outset, while uninformed (or inexperienced) consumers observe the match value only when phys-
ically or virtually inspecting the product. We refer back to the introduction for further illustration.
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with Prob[x < xˆun(pA, pB) ∨ x > 2 − xˆun(pA, pB)] and pB with Prob[xˆun(pA, pB) < x <
2 − xˆun(pA, pB)]. Since x is uniformly distributed on [0, 2], we obtain that Prob[x <
xˆun(pA, pB) ∨ x > 2 − xˆun(pA, pB)] = xˆun(pA, pB)—i.e., from an ex ante perspective pA is
the relevant price with probability Prob[p = pA] = xˆun. Correspondingly, the purchase
at price pB occurs with probability Prob[p = pB] = 1 − xˆun. Thus, the reference point
distribution with respect to the purchase price p is discrete and can be expressed by the
cumulative distribution function
F(p) =

xˆun if p ∈ [pA, pB)
1 if p ≥ pB.
The reference point distribution with respect to the match value refers to the reservation
value v minus the distance between ideal and actual product variety, s ∈ [0, 1], times the
taste parameter t. The distribution of the distance is denoted by G(s) = Prob(|x−yσ| ≤ s),
where the location of the firm is yσ ∈ {0, 1}, and the consumer x’s purchase strategy in
personal equilibrium for given prices is σ ∈ arg max j∈{A,B} u j(x, p j, p− j).13
Let us restrict attention to the case xˆun ≥ 1/2—i.e., firm A has a weakly larger market share
than firm B also for uninformed consumers. Since some uninformed consumers will not
buy from their nearest firm, G(s) is kinked. This kink is determined by the maximum
distance |x − yB| that consumers are willing to accept buying the more expensive product
B, s = 1 − xˆun because s ≤ 1 − xˆun holds for consumers close to either A or B, while
s > 1− xˆun only holds for the more distant consumers of A. Hence, the distribution of s is
G(s) =

2s if s ∈ [0, 1 − xˆun]
s + (1 − xˆun) if s ∈ (1 − xˆun, xˆun]
1 otherwise.
Note that if the indifferent uninformed consumer is located in the center between A and
B, xˆun = 1/2, the expected distance between ideal and actual product taste, E[s], is mini-
mized and equal to 1/4.
Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), after uncertainty is resolved consumers experience
13σ is a function of prices and consumer’s location x conditional on consumer’s expectation about equi-
librium outcomes which are incorporated in their two-dimensional reference point distribution. σ states a
consumer’s personal equilibrium. This equilibrium concept was introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
and requires that behavior-generating expectations must be self-fulfilling in equilibrium.
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a gain-loss utility: The reference distribution is split up for each dimension at the value of
realization in a loss part with weight λ ≥ 1 and a gain part with weight 1. In the loss part
the realized value is compared to the lower tail of the reference distribution; in the gain
part it is compared to the upper tail of the reference distribution. This reflects widespread
experimental evidence that losses are evaluated more negatively than gains.
The indirect utility of an uninformed consumer x ∈ (1− xˆun, 1] purchasing of product A is
given by 14
uA(x, pA, pB) =(v − tx − pA) − λ · Prob[p = pA](pA − pA) + Prob[p = pB](pB − pA)
− λ · t
∫ x
0
(x − s)dG(s) + t
∫ 1
x
(s − x)dG(s). (2)
The first term is the consumer’s intrinsic utility from product A. The second term is the
loss in the price dimension from not facing a lower price than pA. This term is equal to
zero because pA is the lowest price offered in the market place. The third term is the gain
from not facing a higher price than pA, which is positive. The last two terms correspond
to the loss (gain) from not facing a smaller (larger) distance in the taste dimension than x.
Analogously, an uninformed consumer’s indirect utility from a purchase of product B is
given by
uB(x, pA, pB) = v − t(1 − x) − pB︸               ︷︷               ︸
Intrinsic utility
−λ · Prob[p = pA](pB − pA)︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Loss from facing a higher p than pA
−λ · t
∫ 1−x
0
((1 − x) − s)dG(s)︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Loss due to expecting smaller distance than 1−x
+ t
∫ 1
1−x
(s − (1 − x))dG(s)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
Gain due to expecting larger distance than 1−x
(3)
This allows us to explicitly solve a consumer’s personal equilibrium by determining the
location of the indifferent uninformed consumer xˆun.
Lemma 1. Suppose that xˆun ∈ [1/2, 1). Then xˆun is given by
xˆun(∆p) = λ(λ − 1) −
∆p
4t
−
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)∆p +
(λ + 1)2
4(λ − 1)2︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
≡S (∆p)
. (4)
14The indifferent uninformed consumer will be located at x = xˆun, therefore (1 − xˆun, 1] is the relevant
interval for determining xˆun.
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where ∆p ≡ pB − pA.15
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix A.1. The square root, S (∆p), is defined
for ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯] with
∆p¯ ≡ 2t(λ − 1)
(
2(λ + 2) −
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
, (5)
which is strictly positive for all λ > 1. It can be shown that for λ ≥ 3 + 2
√
5 ≈ 7.47,
the indifferent consumer satisfies xˆun(∆p) ∈ [1/2, 1] for all admissible price differences,
∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯]. If the degree of loss aversion is smaller, λ < 3 + 2
√
5, xˆun(∆p¯) rises above
one. Therefore, we have to define another upper bound on the price difference, ∆p˜, with
∆p˜ < ∆p¯ by the solution to xˆun(∆p˜) = 1. We can solve explicitly,
∆p˜ =
(λ + 3)t
2(λ + 1) . (6)
Thus, the upper bound for the price difference (which depends on the parameters t and λ)
for which xˆun is given by equation (4) is:
∆pmax ≡
 ∆p˜, if 1 < λ ≤ λ
c;
∆p¯, if λ > λc.
(7)
with λc ≡ 3 + 2
√
5 ≈ 7.47.16
2.4 Properties of demand of uninformed consumers
In this subsection, we establish a number of properties of demand of uninformed con-
sumers and compare them to those of the demand of informed consumers—i.e., we com-
pare xˆun(∆p) and xˆin(∆p) with one another.
The first property is a continuity property. For λ → 1, the indirect utility function of
uninformed consumers differs from the one of informed consumers only by a constant.
15For x ∈ [0, 1], a consumer’s personal equilibrium is described by
σ(x,∆p) =
A if x ∈ [0, xˆun(∆p)],B if x ∈ (xˆun(∆p), 1].
16Note that ∆p˜ ∈ [t · (√5 − 1)/2, t) ≈ [0.618t, t) for 1 < λ ≤ λc and ∆p¯ ∈ (t · 2(√3 − 2), t · (√5 − 1)/2) ≈
(0.536t, 0.618t) for λ > λc.
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Equation (17) collapses to a linear equation and we obtain xˆun(∆p) = xˆin(∆p) as a solution
in this case.17
The next properties refer to the sensitivity of demand with respect to price. The first
derivative of xˆin(∆p) with respect to ∆p is equal to 1/(2t) for all ∆p.
Remark 1. Evaluated at ∆p = 0, demand of ex ante uninformed consumers reacts less
price sensitive than demand of ex ante informed consumers.
This can be seen as follows: The derivative of xˆun(∆p) with respect to ∆p,
xˆ′un(∆p) = −
1
4t
− 1
2 · S (∆p) ·
(
∆p
8t2
− (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
,
is strictly positive for all ∆p ∈ [0,∆pmax]. Evaluated at ∆p = 0, we obtain
xˆ′un(0) = −
1
4t
+
(λ + 2)
2t(λ + 1) .
Thus, xˆ′un(0) is approaching 1/(2t) from below for λ → 1 and 1/(4t) from above for
λ →∞.
Moreover, xˆun(∆p) is strictly convex for all ∆p ∈ [0,∆pmax], as illustrated in Figure 1.
xˆ′′un(∆p) =
(3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)
64t2 · (S (∆p))3 > 0
We note that the degree of convexity of xˆun(∆p) is strictly increasing in λ.
Evaluated at large price differences, the property concerning the price sensitivity, is re-
versed: For ∆p → ∆p¯ the square root, S (∆p), turns to zero and xˆ′un(∆p) turns to infinity.
Thus, xˆ′un(∆p¯) > xˆ′in(∆p¯) = 1/(2t). Demand of uninformed consumers, evaluated at a
large price difference, reacts more sensitive to an increase in the price difference than the
demand of informed consumers. (This property is satisfied if the indifferent consumer at
this price difference is strictly interior; otherwise some more care is needed, as is done in
Section 4.)
Since xˆ′in(∆p) is constant and xˆ′un(∆p) continuous and monotone (with the required bound-
ary properties), applying the mean value theorem, there exists a unique intermediate price
17Thus, reference-dependence without loss aversion does not cause deviations from standard consumer
behavior in this setup. The continuity property holds in our specification where the gain-loss utility in the
price and in the match value dimension enter with equal weights. It does not hold for different weights, see
Karle and Peitz (2009)
Pricing and Information Disclosure inMarkets with Loss-Averse Consumers 14
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
∆p
xˆin(∆p) : dashed, xˆun(∆p) : solid
Location of the indifferent informed and uninformed consumer (= demand of firm A)
as a function of ∆p for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3; ∆p¯ = 0.8348, ∆p˜ = 3/4
and ∆pˆ = 0.2789.
Figure 1: Demand of informed and uninformed consumers
difference ∆pˆ ∈ [0,∆p¯] such that xˆ′un(∆pˆ) = xˆ′in(∆pˆ) = 1/(2t). This critical price differ-
ence can be explicitly calculated as
∆pˆ =
t
(
2
√
2 · (2(λ + 2)) − 3 ·
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
√
2(λ − 1)
,
which is strictly positive for all λ > 1 since ∆pˆ(λ = 1) = 0 and ∆pˆ′(λ) > 0.
Hence, we find the following:
Remark 2. The demand of uninformed (or loss-averse) consumers is less price sensitive
than the demand of informed consumers if the price difference is small, ∆p < ∆pˆ.
The underlying intuition is that, for a small price difference, loss-averse consumers are
harder to attract by price cuts because their gain from a lower price is outweighed by
their loss in the taste dimension if they buy the other product. Thus, demand of loss-
averse consumers reacts less sensitive to price in this range. For large price differences,
however, their gain from lower prices starts to dominate their loss in the taste dimension
if consumers switch to the cheaper producer.
Remark 3. The demand of uninformed (or loss-averse) consumers is more price sensitive
than the demand of informed consumers if the price difference is large, ∆p > ∆pˆ.
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In Section 4, we will see that this property is a driving force for our comparative static
results in asymmetric markets.
3 Market Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize equilibrium candidates rearranging first-order conditions.
In Appendix B, we provide conditions under which an interior equilibrium in the asym-
metric duopoly exists and under which it is unique. We start by establishing some prop-
erties of market demand which will be needed below.
3.1 Properties of market demand
Using results from Section 2.4, we define the upper bound of firm A’s demand of unin-
formed consumers as18
xˆun(∆pmax) ≡
 xˆun(∆p˜) = 1, if 1 < λ ≤ λ
c
,
xˆun(∆p¯) < 1, if λ > λc.
(8)
Combining (1) and (4), we obtain the market demand of firm A as the weighted sum of
the demand by informed and uninformed consumers,
qA(∆p; β) = β · xˆin(∆p) + (1 − β) ·
 xˆun(∆p), if 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆p
max
1, if t ≥ ∆p ≥ ∆pmax
=

1
2 − 14t (1 − 3β)∆p + (1 − β) (λ+1)2(λ−1) − (1 − β)S (∆p), if 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax
β · t+∆p2t + (1 − β), if t ≥ ∆p ≥ ∆pmax
≡
 φ(∆p; β), if 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆p
max
β · t+∆p2t + (1 − β), if t ≥ ∆p ≥ ∆pmax.
(9)
The demand of firm A is a function in the price difference ∆p, which is kinked at ∆pmax.
Furthermore, it is discontinuous at ∆pmax if ∆pmax = ∆p¯. It approaches one for ∆p = t.19
18 xˆun(∆p¯) = λλ−1 −
2(λ+2)−
√
4(λ+2)2−(λ+1)2
2(λ−1) ∈ (
√
3/2, 1) for λ > λc—i.e., xˆun(∆p¯) is less than one for λ > λc.
This leads to a jump in demand of uninformed consumers at ∆p¯ from xˆun(∆p¯) to one (see the definition of
qA(∆p; β)), since xˆ′un(∆p) → ∞ for ∆p → ∆p¯.
19At ∆p = t, firm A serves also all distant informed consumers which are harder to attract than distant
uninformed consumers because the former do not face a loss in the price dimension if buying from the more
expensive firm B. For ∆p > t demand of firm A shows a second kink. We ignore this region since we are
interested in cases in which both firms face strictly positive demand.
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Firm B’s demand is determined analogously by qB(∆p; β) = 1 − qA(∆p; β). We focus
on interior equilibria in which both products are purchased by a strictly positive share of
uninformed consumers—i.e., ∆p is lower than ∆pmax. This holds in industries in which
firms are not too asymmetric.
The derivative of the demand of A with respect to β expresses how demand changes as the
share of ex ante informed consumers is increased. It is the difference between the demand
of informed and uninformed consumers:
∂φ(∆p; β)
∂β
≡ φβ = xˆin(∆p) − xˆun(∆p) = 34t∆p −
λ + 1
2(λ − 1) + S (∆p) ≷ 0
with φβ = 0 at ∆p = 0 and ∆p = t/2. This derivative can be of positive or negative sign.
Lemma 2. The demand of firm A, qA(∆p; β) = φ(∆p; β), is strictly increasing and convex
in ∆p for 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. In the remainder, we often refer to φ as a short-
hand notation for φ(∆p; β). The derivative ∂φ/∂p is denoted by φ′.
3.2 Equilibrium characterization
We next turn to the equilibrium characterization. At the first stage, firms foresee con-
sumers’ purchase decisions and set prices simultaneously to maximize profits. This yields
first-order conditions
∂πi
∂pi
= qi + (pi − ci) ∂qi∂pi = 0 , i = A, B
If the solution has the feature that demand of each group of consumers, informed and
uninformed, is strictly positive, first-order conditions can be written as
∂πA
∂pA
= φ − (pA − cA)φ′ = 0 (FOCA)
∂πB
∂pB
= (1 − φ) − (pB − cB)φ′ = 0. (FOCB)
We refer to a solution characterized by these first-order conditions as an interior solution.
We will discuss the issue of sufficiency of first-order conditions as well as the issue of
non-interior solutions and non-existence in Appendix B. Since the profit function of the
low-cost firm is not quasi-concave we cannot use standard results to establish equilibrium
existence. We now turn to the characterization of interior equilibria (p∗A, p∗B).
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Lemma 3. In an interior equilibrium with equilibrium prices (p∗A, p∗B), the price difference
∆p∗ = p∗B − p∗A satisfies
∆p∗ = ∆c + f (∆p∗; β), (10)
where ∆c = cB − cA and f (∆p; β) = (1 − 2φ)/φ′.
Proof. Combining (FOCA) and (FOCB) yields the required equilibrium condition as a
function of price differences. 
Thus, (10) implicitly defines the equilibrium price difference ∆p∗ as a function of the
parameters ∆c, β, λ, and t, where the latter two parameters affect the functional form of f
via φ.20 For ∆c > 0 it is not possible to obtain explicit analytical solutions, see Appendix
C for numerical solutions at particular parameter values. Our companion paper, Karle
and Peitz (2009), which focuses on symmetric oligopoly, reports the explicit analytical
solution for the symmetric duopoly (i.e., the case ∆c = 0).
4 Cost Asymmetries
In this section, we obtain a number of comparative statics results in the degree of cost
asymmetry—i.e., the level of ∆c = cB − cA.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium price difference ∆p∗(∆c, β) is an increasing function of
the cost asymmetry between firms ∆c. Moreover, the price difference reacts more sensitive
to ∆c than in a market in which all consumers are informed ex ante, d(∆p∗)/d(∆c) ≥ 1/3.
The proofs of the propositions of this subsection are relegated to Appendix A.
This result says that the more pronounced the cost asymmetry the larger the price differ-
ence between high-cost and low-cost firm. This result shows that standard comparative
statics result with respect to cost difference are qualitatively robust to consumers being
20Anderson and Renault (2009) face an, at first glance, similar fixed point problem as in (10). They
consider a general differentiated product Bertrand duopoly with covered markets in which asymmetries
arise due to quality differences between firms. The authors show uniqueness and existence of a pure-
strategy price equilibrium under the assumption of strict log-concavity of firms’ demand. Although strict
log-concavity allows for some convexity of demand, in our setup this property is not met since for large
price differences the convexity of the low-price firm’s demand rises above any bound—i.e., φ′′ → ∞ for
∆p → ∆p¯.
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loss averse. However, in our model the marginal effect of an increase in cost differences
on price variation is stronger if some consumers are loss averse—recall that a market in
which all consumers are informed is observationally equivalent to the standard Hotelling
case. Our model thus predicts exacerbated price variation in markets with uninformed
loss-averse consumers.21 We find price variation at an increasing rate in our model. Intu-
itively, the more efficient firm (firm A) is tempted to use consumer expectation manage-
ment to increase its market share: Announcing a very low price ex ante makes loss-averse
consumers more reluctant than rational consumers to buy from the less efficient firm (firm
B) later on.
We next take a look at the individual prices set by the two firms. For comparative statics
we use markups m∗i ≡ p∗i − ci, i ∈ {A, B} instead of prices because markups are net
of individual costs and depend solely on cost differences.22 Alternatively, we could use
individual prices and consider a change of the rival’s costs only.
First, we observe that the low-cost firm’s markup may be increasing or decreasing, de-
pending on the cost difference ∆c and the share of uninformed consumers in the market.
Proposition 2. For β < 1 and λ > 1, the equilibrium markup charged by the low-cost
firm m∗A(∆c) ≡ p∗A(∆c, cA) − cA is either first increasing and then decreasing in the cost
difference if the share of informed consumers β is high, or globally decreasing if β is
sufficiently low. For β = 1 or λ → 1, m∗A(∆c) is increasing in the cost difference.
In the latter case—i.e., for β = 1 or λ → 1—when all consumers are informed or the
behavioral bias vanishes we obtain the standard Hotelling result that the low-cost firm
faces a larger markup in more asymmetric markets.
While in the standard Hotelling world without behavioral biases (β = 1) the markup of the
more efficient firm is increasing in the cost difference, the proposition shows that a local
increase of the cost difference may have the reverse effect under consumer loss aversion
(β < 1, λ > 1). This holds true in strongly asymmetric markets: The price sensitivity
of demand is larger than in the standard Hotelling world due to the dominating loss in
21This is different in spirit to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) who found that price variation is reduced
in markets with loss-averse consumers. In Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) consumers do not observe prices
before forming their two-dimensional reference point distribution. Firms therefore can deviate from con-
sumers expectations about prices. This creates a discontinuity in consumers’ gain-loss utility and yields to
a kinked demand curve at the expected price. The kinked demand curve leads to price rigidities for some
cost interval and a multiplicity of equilibria. See also Section 3.5 in our companion paper Karle and Peitz
(2009).
22This follows directly from firms’ first-order conditions. ∆c affects pi − ci = φ(∆p)/φ′(∆p) via ∆p.
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Equilibrium markups of firm A and B for markets in which either all consumers are
uninformed (β = 0) or informed (=benchmark case, β = 1) as a function of cost
differences ∆c for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3: ∆cnd(β = 0) = 0.75963.
Figure 2: Equilibrium markup of both firms
the price dimension. We observe that, under very large cost differences, firm A’s markup
might fall below its level in the standard Hotelling world (compare Figure 2).
Second, we consider the markup of firm B.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium markup charged by the high-cost firm m∗B(∆c) ≡ p∗B(∆c, cB)−
cB is decreasing in the cost difference.
Note that, for β = 1, dm∗B/d(∆c) is equal to −1/3. As it turns out, the qualitative finding
that the equilibrium markup of the high-cost firm is decreasing in the cost difference is
preserved under consumer loss aversion. Due to a level effect of high markups we find that
firm B’s markup is decreasing more strongly than in the standard Hotelling world without
behavioral bias. However, the critical market asymmetry for which firm B’s markup drops
below its Hotelling level has to be larger than for firm A. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
5 The Role of Information
In this section, we focus on comparative statics results with respect to β, the share of
initially informed consumers. In other words, we investigate the effects of ex ante infor-
mation disclosure on market outcomes in asymmetric markets. This allows us to provide
a new perspective on information disclosure policies by public authorities and firms. In
contrast to traditional work on information disclosure policies, in our theory consumers
are fully informed at the moment of purchase, independent of whether or not there is any
information disclosure. Our theory hints at the role of timing of information disclosure.
With respect to voluntary disclosure, we provide new insights into the firms’ advertising
and marketing activities.
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5.1 The effect of ex ante information on prices and quantities
Our first result concerns the equilibrium price difference. (The proofs to the results of this
section are relegated to the Appendix.)
Proposition 4. The equilibrium price difference ∆p∗(β) is decreasing in β.
The above proposition says that prices become more equal as the share of initially in-
formed consumers increases, or, in other words, as the population average becomes less
loss-averse.
Put differently, a larger share of (uninformed) loss-averse consumers leads to a larger
price difference. This is in stark contrast to one of the main findings in Heidhues and
Koszegi (2008) who show that, in their setting, consumer loss aversion is a rationale
for focal prices. In absence of the behavioral bias firms would condition prices on their
marginal costs. Using our terminology, they compare a setting with mass 1 of uninformed
consumers—i.e., β = 0, to a setting with mass 0 of uninformed consumers, which corre-
sponds to a world without behavioral bias. Their message is that consumer loss aversion
tends to lead to (more) equal prices; our finding, by contrast, says that consumer loss
aversion leads to a larger price difference in a market with asymmetric firms.
Let us now look at the individual prices set by the two firms. Firms have to trade-off the
business-stealing effect with the effect on the profit margin. This trade-off changes as the
share of informed consumers is changed. We, first, observe that the low-cost firm’s price
is monotone (i.e., globally increasing or decreasing) or inverse U-shaped in β, depending
on the parameter constellation.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium price charged by the low-cost firm p∗A(β) may be increas-
ing or decreasing in the share of informed consumers β: p∗A(β) is globally increasing,
globally decreasing, or first increasing and then decreasing in β. It tends to be decreasing
given a small cost difference and increasing given a large one.
The critical price difference (that implies the critical cost difference) at which price locally
does not respond to β (c.p. ∆p—i.e., the partial effect) can be solved for analytically. The
critical ∆p is a function of λ and t and is independent of β:
∆pcrit ∂pA(λ, t) = t
4(3 + 5λ)
(
(9 − (26 − 15λ)λ) +
√
3 · | − 1 + 5λ|
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ − 1)2
)
For example, for parameters λ = 3 and t = 1 the critical price difference, at which the
price of the low-cost firm reaches its maximum, satisfies ∆pcrit ∂pA(3, 1) = 0.2534. It is
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also insightful to evaluate the derivative in the limit as β turns to 1. In this case, we can
also solve analytically for a critical ∆p at which the total derivative of pA is zero—i.e.,
dp∗A(∆p∗(β);β)
dβ = 0:
∆pcrit dpA(λ, t) = t3(λ(31λ + 42) − 41) −
√
21 · |7 − 11λ| √(λ + 3)(3λ + 5)
2(λ − 3)(9λ − 1) at β = 1.
For example, ∆pcrit dpA(3, 1) = 7/26 = 0.2692 at β = 1. This means that, given parameters
λ = 3 and t = 1, if the equilibrium price difference satisfies ∆p∗(1) < 0.2692 a small de-
crease in the share of informed consumers leads to a higher price of the more efficient firm,
dp∗A/dβ < 0—the numerical results reported in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix C illustrate
this result. By contrast, for ∆p∗(1) > 0.2692, the opposite holds—i.e., dp∗A/dβ > 0—as
illustrated in Table 4 in Appendix C.
The previous proposition implies that consumers who end up buying from the low-cost
firm may actually be worse off when additional consumers become informed ex ante.
Consider a change in policy from β to β′ with β′ > β—this parameterizes the market
environment. Note that the majority of consumers buy from the low-price firm in both
market environments. For a sufficiently large cost asymmetry, the equilibrium price of
the low-cost firm is locally increasing for all environments between β and β′. Hence, all
those consumers of the low-cost firm whose ex ante information is constant across the
two market environments are worse off under information disclosure to a share of β′ − β
of initially uninformed consumers.
We now turn to the high-cost firm. Here, our result is qualitatively similar: The price tends
to be decreasing in β for small cost differences and increasing for large cost differences.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium price of the high-cost firm p∗B(β) may be increasing or
decreasing in the share of informed consumers β: p∗B(β) is monotonously increasing,
monotonously decreasing, or first increasing and then decreasing in β.
We solve for critical values at which the price change changes sign:
∆pcrit ∂pB(λ, t) = t
2(λ + 1)(λ + 7)
(
(−23 + (λ − 10)λ) + |5 − λ|
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ − 1)2
)
For instance, ∆pcrit ∂pB(3, 1) = 0.3201. At β = 1 we can solve analytically for a critical ∆p
at which the total derivative of pB is zero—i.e., (dp∗B(∆p∗(β); β))/dβ = 0:
∆pcrit dpB(λ, t) =
t
(
3(λ(17λ + 6) − 55) − √15 · |11 − 7λ| √(λ + 3)(3λ + 5)
)
4λ(3λ − 11)
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For instance, ∆pcrit dpB(3, 1) = 1/2 · (5√35 − 29) = 0.2902 at β = 1. Thus, for ∆p∗(1) <
0.2902, we obtain dpB/dβ < 0 at β = 1− ǫ (compare Tables 2 and 3), while, for ∆p∗(1) >
0.2902, we obtain dpB/dβ > 0 at β = 1 (compare Table 4). Thus, for these parameter
values, the overall effect of a marginal increase in β can indeed become positive if cost
asymmetries are sufficiently large.
Let us distinguish consumer groups by the product they consume. We observe that
∆pcrit dpB(λ, t) > ∆pcrit dpA(λ, t) for all λ, t. Hence, for a larger range of cost parameters
the price of the high-cost firm is locally decreasing (compared to the low-cost firm). This
implies that, focusing on the consumers whose ex ante information remains unchanged,
there exists an intermediate range of values of β under which consumers of the low-cost
product are worse off, whereas consumers of the high-cost product are better off after
an increase in β. Since the high-cost firm sells to fewer consumers than the low-cost
firm we call consumers who buy the high-cost product niche consumers. Then, informed
niche consumers are more likely to benefit from an increase in β than the other informed
consumers.
The above observation helps us to shed some light on information acquisition by con-
sumers. A particular application are consumer clubs that provide early information on
match value to its members. Whether existing club members have an incentive to attract
additional members, depends on the market environment. Our above observation also in-
dicates, that consumer clubs may be more likely to be formed by niche consumers. We
also note that a forward-looking club may be willing to cope with increasing prices for
a while with the understanding that, as the club further increases in size (reflected by an
increase in β) prices will eventually fall.
With respect to equilibrium demand our model generates the following prediction:
dqA(∆p∗(β); β)
dβ = β
dxˆin(∆p∗)
d(∆p∗) ·
d(∆p∗)
dβ + xˆin(∆p
∗) + (1 − β)dxˆun(∆p
∗)
d(∆p∗) ·
d(∆p∗)
dβ − xˆun(∆p
∗)
=
∂qA(∆p∗)
∂(∆p∗)︸     ︷︷     ︸
+
· d(∆p
∗)
dβ︸  ︷︷  ︸
+
+(xˆin(∆p∗) − xˆun(∆p∗)) ≷ 0,
which is positive for small cost (resp. price) differences and negative for large cost (resp.
price) differences—see also Figure 3. Hence, in moderately asymmetric markets the de-
mand of the more efficient firm rises, as the share of informed consumers increases, as
illustrated in Table 2 in the Appendix. This implies that in a market with loss-averse
consumers (and a positive share of uninformed consumers) the market share difference is
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Equilibrium demand of firm A for markets with either many uninformed consumers
(β = 0.2) or only informed consumers (=benchmark case, β = 1) as a function of cost
differences ∆c for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3: ∆cnd(β = 0.2) = 1.00993.
Figure 3: Equilibrium demand of firm A
less pronounced than in the standard Hotelling case.23 Our result is reversed in strongly
asymmetric markets in which the demand of the more efficient firm is decreasing in the
share of informed consumers (compare Table 4 in the appendix).
5.2 Private incentives to disclose information
In this subsection, we analyze the firms’ incentives to disclose information. To address
this issue, we investigate the effect of β on profits. Here, private information disclosure
can be seen as the firms’ management of consumer expectations (i.e., reference points).
Note that in our simple setting information disclosure by one firm fully reveals the in-
formation of both firms since consumers make the correct inferences from observing the
match value for one of the two products.24
dπA(∆p∗(β), p∗A(β); β)
dβ =
dp∗A(∆p∗; β)
dβ · qA(∆p
∗; β) +
(
p∗A(∆p∗; β) − cA
)
· dqA(∆p
∗; β)
dβ ≶ 0
23In spirit, this is in line with Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) who predict equal splits of demand between
firms in asymmetric markets.
24This is due to our assumption that firms necessarily locate at distance 1 from each other. It applies to
either the setting in which uninformed consumers do not know their type before forming their reference
point or they do not know the locations of firms in the product space.
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dπB(∆p∗(β), p∗B(β); β)
dβ =
dp∗B(∆p∗; β)
dβ · qB(∆p
∗; β) −
(
p∗B(∆p∗; β) − cB
)
· dqA(∆p
∗; β)
dβ ≶ 0
We confine attention to a numerical example. The critical value of ∆p such that dπA/dβ =
0 at β = 1 and λ = 3 and t = 1, cA = 0.25, and cB = 1 is ∆p = 0.2581. The critical
value of ∆p such that dπB/dβ = 0 at the same parameter values as above is ∆p = 0.2870.
For comparison, we take a look at table 3 in Appendix C: The critical value at β = 1 is
∆p∗(1) = 0.25. Hence, the critical values of ∆p at β < 1 are larger than ∆p∗(1). Moreover,
∆pcritB > ∆p
crit
A .
Our numerical example shows that increasing the initial share of ex ante informed con-
sumers first none, then one and then both firms gain from information disclosure. Since
disclosing information about match value to a positive number of consumers is profitable,
such a strategy will be chosen by profit-maximizing firms (if disclosure is not too costly).
Our finding provides a rationale for truthfully advertising product characteristics at an
early stage, although all consumers would learn them prior to purchase even in the ab-
sence of advertising. Without the behavioral bias it would be irrelevant for market demand
and market outcomes whether or not a firm advertises product characteristics ex ante.
In case of conflicting interests, it is the more efficient firm which locally gains from in-
formation disclosure as an expectation management tool. Thus, our model predicts that
it is rather the more efficient firm that advertises product features. This means that one
should observe a positive correlation between such advertising and the marginal cost of
the firm. For other parameter constellations, we numerically confirmed the robustness of
these results.
5.3 The effect of ex ante information on consumer surplus
In this subsection, we analyze the effect of β on consumer surplus. More precisely, we
answer the question: How is the surplus of the different consumer groups affected by an
increase of the share of informed consumers?
First, consider the change in surplus of informed consumers. The aggregate consumer
surplus for informed consumers is given by
CS in(pA(β), pB(β)) =
∫ xˆin(∆p(β))
0
uA(x, pA(β))dx +
∫ 1
xˆin(∆p(β))
uB(x, pB(β))dx
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The marginal effect of increasing the share of informed consumers on the surplus of the
already informed consumers is
dCS in
dβ =
∫ xˆin(∆p(β))
0
∂uA(x, pA(β))
∂pA(β)︸           ︷︷           ︸
=−1
·dpAdβ · dx +
∫ 1
xˆin(∆p(β))
∂uB(x, pB(β))
∂pB(β)︸           ︷︷           ︸
=−1
·dpBdβ · dx
= −xˆin(∆p)dpAdβ − (1 − xˆin(∆p))
dpB
dβ ≷ 0.
Consumer surplus of informed consumers may increase or decrease in the share of in-
formed consumers. The sign of the derivative is determined by the weighted marginal
price changes dpi/dβ of the two products. It is positive in markets with small cost differ-
ences because both prices decrease in the share of informed consumers (dpi/dβ < 0). It
is negative in markets with large cost differences. In markets with intermediate cost dif-
ferences, the two prices move in different directions. Thus, some informed consumers are
better off, whereas others are worse off in response to an increase in the share of informed
consumers.
Second, consider uninformed consumers. Evaluating the ex ante effect on uninformed
consumers is more involved because gains and losses relative to their reference point
have to be taken into account.
CS un(pA(β), pB(β)) =
( ∫ 1−xˆun(∆p(β))
0
u˜A(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β)))dx
+
∫ xˆun(∆p(β))
1−xˆun(∆p(β))
uA(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β)))dx
)
+
∫ 1
xˆun(∆p(β))
uB(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β)))dx,
where uA and uB represent uninformed consumers’ gain-loss utility for distant consumers
of A and nearby consumers of B derived in (15) and (16), respectively.
u˜A(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β))) =(v − tx − pA) + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA)
− λ · tx2 + t
2
(
(1 − xˆun)2 − 2(1 − x)x + xˆ2un
)
,
is the gain-loss utility for nearby uninformed consumers of A. The function u˜A differs
from uA only in the taste dimension of the gain-loss utility.
Taking derivatives with respect to β, we obtain
dCS un
dβ =
∫ xˆun(∆p(β))
0
(
∂uA(x, .)
∂pA
· dpAdβ +
∂uA(x, .)
∂pB
· dpBdβ
)
· dx
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+
( ∫ 1−xˆun(∆p(β))
0
(
∂u˜A(x, .)
∂xˆun
· dxˆun(∆p)d∆p ·
d∆p
dβ
)
· dx
+
∫ xˆun(∆p(β))
1−xˆun(∆p(β))
(
∂uA(x, .)
∂xˆun
· dxˆun(∆p)d∆p ·
d∆p
dβ
)
· dx
)
+
∫ 1
xˆun(∆p(β))
(
∂uB(x, .)
∂pA
· dpAdβ +
∂uB(x, .)
∂pB
· dpBdβ +
∂uB(x, .)
∂xˆun
· dxˆun(∆p)d∆p ·
d∆p
dβ
)
· dx.
In addition to consumers’ intrinsic utility, a price change affects consumers’ gains and
losses with respect to the price dimension via the varying price difference. A change of the
location of the indifferent uninformed consumer xˆun has an impact on consumers’ gains
and losses in both dimensions. Utility in the taste dimension is affected since an increase
of xˆun shifts mass of the reference point distribution to the upper tail.25 Utility in the price
dimension is affected since the probability of buying at a specific price depends on the
location at which consumers are indifferent between the two products. The equation of
dCS un/dβ can be further simplified to
dCS un
dβ = − xˆun ·
dpA
dβ − (1 − xˆun) ·
dpB
dβ
+
(
(λ − 1)xˆun(1 − xˆun) + ∆p (xˆun + λ(1 − xˆun)) · dxˆund∆p
)
· (−d∆pdβ )
− t
(
1
2
(2xˆun − 1)
(
(λ − 1)(2xˆun − 1) + 2
))
· dxˆund∆p · (−
d∆p
dβ ) ≷ 0. (11)
The first line of equation (11) gives the marginal effect of β on intrinsic utility—this
is analogous to the analysis of informed consumers above. The second line gives the
marginal effect of β on the gain-loss utility in the price dimension, which is positive.
The third line gives the marginal effect of β in the gain-loss utility on the match value
dimension, which is always negative.
The overall effect of β on CS un is positive in symmetric and moderately asymmetric mar-
kets (∆c small) since the effect of β on individual prices pi is negative in these markets
(compare CS in). By contrast, the effect is negative in strongly asymmetric markets. The
surplus result that holds for informed consumers, thus, qualitatively carries over to unin-
formed consumers.
It can be shown that, for all λ > 1 and ∆c feasible, the sum of the second and the third
line of (11) is negative—i.e., the marginal effect of β on the gain-loss utility in the taste
dimension dominates its effect in the price dimension of consumers’. However, this does
25It can be easily shown that G(s|xˆ′un) first-order stochastically dominates G(s|xˆun) for all feasible xˆun, xˆ′un
with xˆ′un > xˆun feasible.
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not suffice to obtain that the sign of dCS un/dβ is changing for a higher level of β in
moderately asymmetric markets since the price changes, which determine the sign change
of consumer surplus, are weighted differently in case of uninformed instead of informed
consumers. Table 3 in the Appendix illustrates that due to the difference in weights the
critical β at which the marginal consumer surplus of uninformed consumers switches sign
is lower than the critical β for informed consumers.
Remark 4. In symmetric and moderately asymmetric markets, all consumers whose in-
formation is unaffected are better off if more consumers become informed before forming
their reference points. By contrast, in strongly asymmetric markets, all these consumers
are worse off.
To determine the overall effect of β on aggregate consumer surplus of both consumer
groups, an additional decomposition effect has to be taken into account. This effect stems
from the change in consumer surplus of the group of formerly uninformed consumers who
become informed. The overall effect of β on aggregate consumer surplus is determined
by the first derivative of CS = β · CS in(pA(β), pB(β)) + (1 − β) · CS un(pA(β), pB(β)) with
respect to β:
dCS
dβ = β ·
dCS in
dβ +CS in + (1 − β) ·
dCS un
dβ − CS un
= β · dCS indβ + (1 − β) ·
dCS un
dβ + (CS in − CS un).
It can be shown that the decomposition effect represented by (CS in − CS un) is always
strictly positive, since uninformed consumers have a lower average utility level due to
the higher weight on losses than on gains. Although some uninformed consumers who
receive high match value at low price are better off than their informed counterparts, the
average utility of uninformed consumers is lower due to the losses in the taste dimension
of consumers located far apart from the product they purchase and the losses in the price
dimension of consumers of product B. For illustration, see the tables in Appendix C.
It turns out that the decomposition effect always dominates the group-specific effects of
β on consumer surplus. This means that the group of those consumers who become in-
formed is so much better off that its surplus increase always dominates the surplus change
of the remaining uninformed consumers and the “old” informed consumers. This holds
even in strongly asymmetric markets in which remaining uninformed and old informed
consumers are worse off if the share of informed consumers increases. We summarize by
the following remark.
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Remark 5. Consumer surplus is increasing in the share of informed consumers, β.
The policy implications are straightforward: A public authority whose aim is to maximize
consumer surplus (and which does not have further distributive concerns about the effects
of information disclosure) should always try to increase the share of informed consumers,
possibly through the use of mandatory information disclosure rules. In symmetric and
moderately asymmetric markets, all consumers will be better off. However, in strongly
asymmetric markets most consumers suffer. Those consumers who become informed
(due to the policy intervention) exert a negative externality on all other consumers. In
such markets, distributive concerns may lead to a reversal of policy.
6 Extensions
6.1 Relative weight on gain-loss utility
Consider consumer preferences for which the intrinsic utility is weighted by one, while
the gain-loss utility has a weight of α > 0.26 A change of the relative weight on the
gain-loss utility affects the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer. Can this be
neutralized by an adjustment of the degree of loss aversion λ? The answer is positive, as
the following proposition shows.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the utility function of uninformed consumers shows an addi-
tional weight, α > 0, on the gain-loss utility—i.e., all terms except for the intrinsic utility
term in (15) (resp. (16)) are pre-multiplied by α.
Then, ∀λ′ > 1, α′ > 0 ∃λ > 1 such that
xˆun(∆p; λ, α = 1) = xˆun(∆p; λ′, α′), (12)
where xˆun(∆p; λ, α) is the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer given α-extended
preferences. Moreover, λ ≥ λ′ for α′ ≥ 1 and λ < λ′ for α′ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. The derivation of the indifferent uninformed consumer with α-
extended preferences is analogous to the derivation of the indifferent uninformed con-
sumer for α = 1 provided in the proof of Lemma 1. With α-extended preferences the
26For α = 0 we are obviously situated in a standard Salop world; for α = 1 we are in the setting analyzed
above.
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location equals
xˆun(∆p; λ, α) = 1 + α(2λ − 1)2α(λ − 1) −
∆p
4t
−
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(α(2λ + 1) + 3)
4αt(λ − 1) ∆p +
(αλ + 1)2
4α2(λ − 1)2 .
(13)
By solving for λ in equation (12) we receive
λ(λ′, α′) = 1 + α
′(2λ′ − 1)
1 + α′
. (14)
Since λ(λ′, α′ = 1) = λ′ and ∂λ/∂α′ = 2(λ′ − 1)/(1 + α′)2 > 0, λ shows the required
properties. 
The previous proposition points out that, for any change of the relative weight on gain-
loss utility, there is a compensating change of the degree of loss aversion, λ, which gives
rise to the same demand function as before the change.
6.2 Asymmetric product quality
Our model is easily extended to allow for differences in product quality which are known
to consumers at the beginning of the game. An informed consumer’s utility function is
ui(x, pi) = (vi − pi) − t|yi − x|. We then distinguish between a quality-adjusted price
dimension, which includes easily communicated product characteristics of unambiguous
value to consumers, and a taste dimension, which includes those product characteristics
whose value depends on the consumer type. We define quality-adjusted (or hedonic)
prices p˜i = pi − vi, i = A, B, for all consumers and consider those to be relevant for
consumers’ purchase decision. The main difference arises for uninformed consumers
when building their reference point distribution with respect to prices. Here, only the
gain and loss in quality-adjusted prices ∆p˜ = ∆p − ∆v matters, ∆v ≡ vB − vA. We label
firms such that ∆c − ∆v > 0 and call firm A the more efficient firm. In the following
proposition we show that any market with asymmetric quality is equivalent to a market
with symmetric quality and adjusted asymmetric costs.
Proposition 8. For any market with asymmetric quality represented by a vector (∆v,∆c)
with ∆c − ∆v > 0, there exists a market with symmetric quality represented by a vector
(∆v′,∆c′) with ∆v′ = 0, ∆c′ > 0 such that market equilibria of both markets are the
same—i.e., ∆p∗ − ∆v = ∆p′∗. Moreover, ∆c′ = ∆c − ∆v.
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As a special case, the asymmetry in the former market is generated by quality differences—
i.e., firm A sells higher quality in a market with symmetric costs, ∆v < 0 and ∆c = 0.
Then, the costs asymmetry in the second market shows the same size, in absolute terms,
as the quality difference in the first market, ∆c′ = −∆v.
In the proof, we show that the optimization problems of the two consumer groups and the
firms are the same in both markets.
Proof of Proposition 8. To begin with, consider informed consumers’ utility: We find
ui(x, pi) = (vi − pi) − t|yi − x| = −p˜i − t|yi − x| for all i ∈ {A, B} in the former market
and ui(x, p′i) = (v′i − p′i) − t|yi − x| for all i ∈ {A, B} in the latter market. Since in the
latter market quality levels are identical (∆v′ = 0), it holds true that xˆin(∆p˜) = xˆin(∆p′) for
∆p′ = ∆p−∆v. If uninformed consumers use quality-adjusted prices for determining their
reference point distribution in the price dimension, we also receive xˆun(∆p˜) = xˆun(∆p′)
for ∆p′ = ∆p − ∆v by the same argument.
Next, consider the firms’ maximization problem in both markets. Firm A solves
max
p˜A
πA(p˜A, p˜B) = (p˜A + vA − cA)[β · xˆin(p˜B − p˜A) + (1 − β) · xˆun(p˜B − p˜A)] and
max
p′A
πA(p′A, p′B) = (p′A − c′A)[β · xˆin(p′B − p′A) + (1 − β) · xˆun(p′B − p′A)].
Firm A’s equilibrium prices are identical if and only if markups in both markets are
identical—i.e., p˜A + vA − cA = p′A − c′A—and both demand functions are identical—i.e.,
∆p′ = ∆p − ∆v. Analogously, for firm B, this holds true if and only if p˜B + vB − cB =
p′B − c′B and ∆p′ = ∆p − ∆v. Finally, taking markup differences between firms, we obtain
∆p˜ + ∆v − ∆c = ∆p − ∆c in the former market and ∆p′ − ∆c′ in the latter market. For
∆p′ = ∆p − ∆v, both markup differences are the same if and only if ∆c′ = ∆c − ∆v. 
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the impact of consumer loss aversion on market out-
comes in asymmetric imperfectly competitive markets. We did so in a Hotelling-Salop
setting, which is a standard workhorse in the modern industrial-organization literature.
Consumer loss aversion makes a difference compared to a market in which consumers
lack this behavioral bias, if they are uncertain about product characteristics or associ-
ated match value at an initial stage, when they form their reference point distribution.
Since price information is readily available, firms can use price to manage the reference
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point distribution of consumers in the price and the match value dimension. Also, firms’
information-disclosure policy can be seen as an expectation management tool. Such in-
formation disclosure can be achieved through advertising campaigns and promotional ac-
tivities, which do not generate additional information at the moment of purchase (at this
point, consumers would be informed in any case), but inform consumers way in advance
of their actual purchasing decision.
We analyzed how firm asymmetries and the share of uninformed loss-averse consumers
in the population affect market outcomes. Here, we analyzed industries that are charac-
terized by cost asymmetries. Alternatively, asymmetries with respect to observed product
quality may be introduced (as explored in Section 6). Since there is a one-to-one relation-
ship between these two models, our insights are directly applicable to a model in which
firms differ in observed product quality. We show that a larger cost advantage may lead
to a lower markup of the low-cost firm.
Our theory provides a new perspective on private information disclosure and advertising.
Since all consumers are fully informed at the purchasing stage, standard theory would
predict that it is irrelevant how far in advance of the purchasing stage information is
revealed. Our theory predicts that consumer behavior and market outcomes depend on
whether and to what extent match-value relevant information is revealed at an early stage.
Our results have implications for public policy and firms’ advertising strategies. There
are instances in which consumers would gain from more information whereas both firms
would not. Thus, firms refrain from early information disclosure in these instances—
namely when the market is symmetric or moderately asymmetric. In these markets, pub-
lic information disclosure (which allows consumers to learn the products’ match values)
would enhance the surplus of all consumer groups.
Moreover, our model predicts that advertising and other marketing instruments that allow
for voluntary early information disclosure about match value are more prevalent in mar-
kets characterized by large asymmetries between firms. In these asymmetric markets, one
or both firms gain from information disclosure because this leads to higher prices.
A feature of our setting is that, if a firm releases information on the match value of its
product, consumers fully infer the match value of the other product, as well. Future work
may want to look at alternative settings in which information is not perfectly correlated
across products, giving rise to a richer set of information-disclosure policies.
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Appendix
A Relegated Proofs
A.1 Relegated proof of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the properties of the reference distributions, we rewrite the util-
ity function further,
uA(x, pA, pB) =(v − tx − pA) + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA)
− λ · t
( ∫ 1−xˆun
0
2(x − s) ds +
∫ x
1−xˆun
(x − s) ds
)
+ t
( ∫ xˆun
x
(s − x) ds
)
=(v − tx − pA) + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA)
− λ · t
2
(
x2 + 2x(1 − xˆun) − (1 − xˆun)2
)
+
t
2
(xˆun − x)2 (15)
uB(x, pA, pB) =(v − t(1 − x) − pB) − λ · xˆun(pB − pA) − λ · t
∫ 1−x
0
2((1 − x) − s) ds
+ t
( ∫ 1−xˆun
1−x
2(s − (1 − x)) ds +
∫ xˆun
1−xˆun
(s − (1 − x)) ds
)
=(v − t(1 − x) − pB) − λ · xˆun(pB − pA) − λ · t(1 − x)2
+ t
(
(x − xˆun)2 + (12 − x − xˆun + 2xxˆun)
)
. (16)
Next, we find the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer x = xˆun by setting
uA = uB, where
uA(xˆun, pA, pB) = v − txˆun − pA + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA) − λ · t2
(
1 − 2(1 − xˆun)2
)
uB(xˆun, pA, pB) = v − t(1 − xˆun) − pB − λ · xˆun(pB − pA) − λ · t(1 − xˆun)2 + 2t(12 − xˆun)
2
If she buys product A the indifferent uninformed consumer will experience no gain but the
maximum loss in the taste dimension. If she buys product B she will experience a gain
and a loss because distance could have been smaller or larger than 1− xˆun. With respect to
the price dimension the indifferent uninformed consumer (like all other consumers) faces
only a loss when paying price pB and only a gain when paying price pA.
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uA(xˆun, pA, pB) = uB(xˆun, pA, pB) can be transformed to the following quadratic equation
in xˆun,
0 = 2t(λ − 1) · xˆ2un −
(
(λ − 1)(pB − pA) − 4tλ
)
· xˆun +
(
2(pB − pA) + t2(3λ + 1)
)
(17)
Solving this quadratic equation in xˆun leads to the expression given in the lemma. 
A.2 Relegated proof of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2.
φ′ =
∂qA(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= −∂qA(∆p; β)
∂pA
= −∂qB(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= −∂qB(∆p; β)
∂pB
= β · xˆ′in(∆p) + (1 − β) · xˆ′un(∆p)
= − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) − (1 − β)
2(S (∆p))
(
∆p
8t2 −
(λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
⊖
> 0
Hence, φ′ > 0 ∀∆p feasible and ∀β. At the boundaries we have
φ′(0; β) = − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) + (1 − β) (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1) > 0
lim
∆p↑∆ p¯
φ′(∆; β) = ∞ for β < 1 since S (∆p¯) = 0.
For 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax the demand of A is convex in ∆p.
φ′′(∆p; β) = (1 − β) · xˆ′′un(∆p) = (1 − β) ·
(3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)
64t2 · (S (∆p))3 ≥ 0
Hence, φ′′ > 0 ∀∆p feasible and ∀β < 1 since S (∆p) ≥ 0. At the boundaries we have
φ′′(0; β) = (1 − β) · (3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)
32t2 · (λ+1)3(λ−1)3
> 0
lim
∆p↑∆ p¯
φ′′(∆p; β) = ∞ for β < 1.

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A.3 Relegated proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1.
d(∆p∗)
d(∆c) = −
(φ′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) · (−1) (18)
=
(φ′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ)
Since the denominator of d(∆p∗(∆c))/d(∆c) being equal to zero is equivalent to the tan-
gent condition (30), we obtain that
d(∆p∗)
d(∆c) > 0 (19)
if ∆p < ∆pta(λ, t) (where the latter term is defined in Appendix B). Moreover, since
φ′′(1 − 2φ) = 0 for ∆c = 0 (i.e., ∆p = 0) and φ′′(1 − 2φ) ≤ 0 for ∆c > 0 it holds true that
d(∆p∗(∆c))/d(∆c) ≥ 1/3. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
dm∗A(∆p∗(∆c))
d(∆c) =
∂m∗A
∂(∆p∗) ·
∂(∆p∗)
∂(∆c) ,
where by (FOCA)
∂m∗A
∂(∆p∗) =
∂p∗A
∂(∆p∗) =
(φ′)2 − φ′′ · φ
(φ′)2 ≷ 0, (20)
which may be positive or negative for β < 1. Firm A’s markup is increasing in the price
difference if the price difference is rather low and the share of uninformed consumers is
not too high. It is decreasing for large price differences and/or if the share of uninformed
consumers is high. Using (18) we obtain that
dm∗A(∆p∗(∆c))
d(∆c) =
(φ′)2 − φ′′ · φ
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) ≷ 0. (21)
Hence m∗A is not strictly increasing in ∆p∗. Firm A’s markup decreases in the price differ-
ence if the price difference—i.e., if the cost asymmetries in the industry, and/or the share
of uninformed consumers become too large. (Compare markup of firm B.) 
Pricing and Information Disclosure inMarkets with Loss-Averse Consumers 35
Proof of Proposition 3.
dm∗B(∆p∗(∆c))
d(∆c) =
∂m∗B
∂(∆p∗) ·
∂(∆p∗)
∂(∆c) ,
where by (FOCB)
∂m∗B
∂(∆p∗) =
∂p∗B
∂(∆p∗) =
−(φ′)2 − φ′′ · (1 − φ)
(φ′)2 < 0, (22)
which is always negative for all β. Using (18) we obtain that
dm∗B(∆p∗(∆c))
d(∆c) = −
(φ′)2 + φ′′ · (1 − φ)
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) < 0. (23)

A.4 Relegated proofs of Section 5
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that the equilibrium is implicitly characterized by
∆p − ∆c − 1 − 2φ(∆p; β)
φ′(∆p; β) = 0
The equilibrium price difference then satisfies
d∆p∗(β)
dβ = −
(
1 − −2(φ
′)2 − φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2
)−1(
−
−2φ′ ∂φ
∂β
− ∂φ′
∂β
(1 − 2φ)
φ′2
)
= − (φ
′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) ·
(2φ′φβ + φ′β − 2φ′βφ
(φ′)2
)
= −
2φ′φβ + φ′β(1 − 2φ)
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ)
We show that the numerator of d(∆p
∗(β))
dβ , denoted by N(∆p∗; β) = −(2φ′φβ + φ′β(1 − 2φ)) is
negative: For all ∆p with 0 ≤ ∆p ≤ ∆pmax and for all β ∈ [0, 1], we can rewrite
N(∆p; β) = −2φ′φβ − φ′β(1 − 2φ) = 2((1 − β)xˆ′un + β
1
2t
) · (xˆun − xˆin)
+(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − 2(1 − β)xˆun − 2βxˆin)
=
1
t
(xˆun − xˆin) + (xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − 2xˆin)
=
1
t
xˆun + (xˆ′un)(1 − 2xˆin) −
1
2t
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=
1
t
(xˆun + 12) − xˆ
′
un(2xˆin − 1)
= −2txˆ′un · (xˆin −
1
2
) + 1(xˆun − 12)
= −2txˆ′un(∆p)(xˆin(∆p) −
1
2
) + (xˆun(∆p) − 12)
Since N(0; β) = 0 and
∂N(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= −1
t
(
2txˆ′′un(∆p)(xˆin(∆p) −
1
2
) + 2t(xˆ′un(∆p))(xˆ′in(∆p)) − xˆ′un(∆p)
)
= −1
t
(
2txˆun(∆p)(xˆin(∆p) − 12) + 0 − 0
)
< 0
it holds that N(∆p∗; β) ≤ 0 for all admissible ∆p, β.
Consider now the denominator of d(∆p
∗(β))
dβ , denoted by D(∆p∗; β) = 3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ).
We show that, on the relevant domain of price differences, D(∆p∗; β) is strictly positive.
We have that
D(0; β) = 3(φ′(0; β))2 + φ′′(0; β) · 0
= 3(φ′(0; β))2 > 0
The sign of the derivative is of ambiguous sign:
∂D(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= 6φ′φ′′ + φ′′′(1 − 2φ) − 2φ′′φ′
= 4φ′φ′′ + φ′′′(1 − 2φ)
Thus D(∆p∗; β) is not necessarily non-negative. However, since D(∆p∗; β) is equivalent
to the tangent condition (30) which approaches zero at ∆p = ∆pta(λ, t) we conclude that
d∆p∗(β)
dβ < 0 (24)
for ∆p < ∆pta(λ, t), which is the relevant domain for equilibrium existence. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We evaluate
dp∗A(∆p∗(β); β)
dβ =
∂p∗A
∂(∆p∗) ·
∂(∆p∗)
∂β
+
∂p∗A
∂β
,
where
∂p∗A
∂(∆p∗) =
(φ′)2 − φ′′ · φ
(φ′)2 ≷ 0,
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which may be positive or negative. Hence p∗A is not strictly increasing in ∆p∗. Firm
A’s prices decreases in the price difference if the price difference becomes sufficiently
large. In terms of the parameters of the model this means that the cost asymmetries in the
industry (and the share of uninformed consumers) becomes sufficiently large.
∂p∗A
∂β
=
φ′φβ − φ′βφ
(φ′)2
= −
[
((1 − β)xˆ′un + βxˆ′in)(xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆ′un − xˆ′in) · ((1 − β)xˆun + βxˆin)
]
· 1
φ′2
= −
[
(1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) − (1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) 12t (xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆun −
1
2t
)xˆin
]
· 1
φ′2
= −
[ 1
2t
xˆun − xˆ′un xˆin
]
· 1
φ′2
The numerator of ∂p
∗
A
∂β
is independent of β.
∂p∗A
∂β
(∆p = 0) = −1
2
( 1
2t
− xˆ′un(0)
)
· 1
φ′(0)2 < 0
∂p∗A
∂β
(∆p = ∆p¯ − ǫ) = −
(
1
2t xˆun − xˆ′un xˆin
)
φ′2
> 0
for ǫ small because the numerator is positive for ∆p slightly less than ∆p¯. This implies
that ∂p
∗
A
∂β
= 0 for a critical ∆p ∈ (0,∆pmax),∀β. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We evaluate
dp∗B(∆p∗(β); β)
dβ =
∂p∗B
∂(∆p∗) ·
∂(∆p∗)
∂β
+
∂p∗B
∂β
,
where
∂p∗B
∂(∆p∗) =
−(φ′)2 − φ′′(1 − φ)
(φ′)2 = −
(
1 + φ
′′(1 − φ)
(φ′)2
)
< 0
In contrast to A, the price of B is always decreasing in ∆p∗(β).
∂p∗B
∂β
=
−φ′φβ − φ′β(1 − φ)
(φ′)2
= −
[
− ((1 − β)xˆ′un + β
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − (1 − β)xˆun − βxˆin)
]
· 1(φ′)2
= −
[
− (1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) + (1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin)
− 1
2t
(xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − xˆin)
]
· 1(φ′)2
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= −
[
− 1
2t
(xˆun) − (xˆ′un −
1
2t
) + xˆ′un xˆin
]
· 1(φ′)2 ≶ 0

B Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Duopoly
B.1 Equilibrium uniqueness
In Proposition 4 we state sufficient conditions under which an interior equilibrium is
unique. Given parameters λ and t, the condition states that the cost asymmetry between
firms is not too large.27
Lemma 4. An equilibrium is the unique interior equilibrium if
∆c < ∆cu(λ) ≡ ∆p¯ = 2t(λ − 1)
(
2(λ + 2) −
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
. (25)
In the lemma ∆p¯ depicts the upper bound of ∆p such that S (∆p) in xˆun(∆p) is equal to
zero (Cf. equation (5)). It is easy to check that ∆cu(λ) is strictly decreasing in λ. This
means that in markets in which consumers show a higher degree of loss aversion cost
asymmetries between firms can be less pronounced to meet the uniqueness condition.
Proof of Lemma 4. We first consider the case of λ > λc ≈ 7.47. We can derive a number
of useful properties of f (∆p; β) = (1 − 2φ)/φ′:
f (0; β) = 0/φ′(0) = 0∀β, lim∆p↑∆ p¯ f (∆p; β) = 0 since lim∆p↑∆ p¯ φ′(∆p; β) = ∞∀β < 1, and
f (∆p¯; 1) = −2∆p¯ < 0.
f ′(∆p; β) = −2(φ
′)2 − φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2 = −
(
2 +
φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2
)
≶ 0 ∀β < 1,
since f ′(0; β) = −2 < 0 ∀β and lim∆p↑∆ p¯ f ′(∆p; β) = ∞ ∀β < 1. Moreover, f ′(∆p; 1) =
−2 ∀∆p.
It has to be shown that f (∆p; β) is strictly convex in ∆p for β < 1. We find that
f ′′(∆p; β) = −(φ
′φ′′′ − 2(φ′′)2)(1 − 2φ) − 2(φ′)2
(φ′)3 > 0.
27Since t turns out to simply scale equilibrium prices (cf. Section 4), we set t = 1 in Appendix B.
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Equilibrium condition (10) at ∆c = ∆p¯ for parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and
λ = 3: ∆p˜ = 0.75, ∆p¯ = 0.8348.
Figure 4: Two potential interior equilibria
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium condition (10) at ∆c = ∆p¯. Now, if β < 1 by con-
tinuity of f (∆p) for ∆p ∈ [0;∆p¯), f (0; β) = 0, lim∆p↑∆ p¯ f (∆p; β) → 0, f ′(0; β) < 0,
lim∆p↑∆ p¯ f ′(∆p; β) = ∞ > 1, and strict convexity of f (∆p) for β < 1, we know that, for
∆c > ∆p¯, there are two candidate interior equilibria since the ( f (∆p)+∆c)-curve shifts up
and intersects the ∆p-line twice. At ∆c = ∆p¯ a second solution to ∆p = f (∆p; β < 1)+∆p¯
does not arise due to the discontinuity of φ (resp. f (∆p; β < 1)) at ∆p¯. Moreover, for val-
ues of ∆c lower than ∆p¯, ( f (∆p¯; β < 1) + ∆c) is always smaller than ∆p¯ and no other
equilibrium can exist.
If β = 1, f (∆p; β) is strictly decreasing for all ∆p and at most one intersection between
f (∆p; 1) + ∆c and ∆p exists (standard Hotelling case).28
Secondly, in the case of 1 < λ ≤ λc all uninformed consumers buy from firm A at ∆p =
∆p˜, which is smaller than ∆p¯.29 Since f is continuous here, f (∆p˜; β) < 0, and f (∆p; β) =
(1 − 2(βxˆin(∆p) + (1 − β))) · 2t/β is strictly decreasing for ∆p > ∆p˜, ∆c < ∆p¯ is sufficient
to rule out other equilibria in this case. 
We also can provide conditions that non-interior equilibria do not exist. For the sake of
brevity, in the following proposition we restrict attention to the case β = 0.
28In this case an analytical solution for (10) can be determined: ∆p∗ = ∆c/3.
29Cf. Figure 4.
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Lemma 5. Suppose all consumers are uninformed (β = 0) and the degree of loss aversion,
λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2]. Non-interior equilibria do not exist if
∆c ≤ ∆cni(λ) ≡ ∆2p˜(λ) = λ + 3)t(λ + 1) . (26)
Proof of Lemma 5.
The candidate non-interior equilibrium is p∗∗A = cB − ∆pmax, p∗∗B = cB. The associated
profits are π∗∗A = (cB − ∆pmax − cA) · 1 = (∆c − ∆pmax) and π∗∗B = 0. Note that for
∆p∗∗ = ∆pmax setting pB = cB is the local best response of firm B.
We consider a non-local deviation by firm A to pA = cB. The associated profit is (cB −
cA)φ(0) at pA = cB. Hence, a sufficient condition for the non-existence of non-interior
equilibria is
∆c − ∆pmax ≤ (cB − cA)φ(0) = ∆c2 .
This is equivalent to
∆c ≤ 2∆pmax.
For λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2 · √2], ∆pmax is equal to ∆p˜(λ) = (λ + 3)t/(2(λ + 1)), which completes
the proof. 
Combining Lemmata 4 and 5 we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 9. For ∆c < min{∆cu,∆cni}, any equilibrium is unique and interior.
B.2 Equilibrium existence
For any interior solution, concavity of the profit functions would assure that the solution
characterizes an equilibrium.
∂2πA
∂p2A
= −2φ′ + (pA − cA)φ′′ < 0 (S OCA)
∂2πB
∂p2B
= −2φ′ − (pB − cB)φ′′ < 0. (S OCB)
Given the properties of φ —particularly that φ is strictly increasing and convex in ∆p
for β < 1— S OCB holds globally, while S OCA is not necessarily satisfied. Using that
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(pA − cA) = φ/φ′ by FOCA, S OCA can be expressed as follows
−2(φ′)2 + φφ′′ < 0. (27)
It can be easily shown that (27) is satisfied for small ∆p, while it is violated for ∆p → ∆p¯,
as φ′′ goes faster to infinity in ∆p than (φ′)2.30 This violation of S OCA reflects that firm A
may have an incentive to non-locally undercut prices to gain the entire demand of unin-
formed consumers when ∆p is large. The driving force behind this is that loss aversion in
the price dimension increasingly dominates loss aversion in the taste dimension if price
differences become large. Moreover, excessive losses in the price dimension if buying the
expensive product B make also nearby consumers of B more willing to opt for product A.
The next proposition clarifies the issue of equilibrium existence. It deals with the non-
quasiconcavity of firm A’s profit function by determining critical levels of market asym-
metries and the degree of loss aversion such that firm A has no incentive to non-locally
undercut prices. Here, we make use of the increasing convexity of firm A’s profit func-
tion in −pA which yields that stealing the entire demand of uninformed consumers is the
unique optimal deviation of firm A. For notational convenience, we focus on the most
critical setting for equilibrium existence. This is the one in which all consumers are unin-
formed.31
Proposition 10. Suppose all consumers are uninformed (β = 0) and the degree of loss
aversion, λ, lies within the interval (1, 1 + 2√2]. An interior equilibrium with prices
(p∗A, p∗B) exists if and only if
∆c ≤ ∆cnd(λ) ≡ ∆pnd(λ) − f (∆pnd(λ); 0), (28)
with ∆pnd(λ) being implicitly determined by the following non-deviation condition
∆pnd(λ) =
{
0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax | ∆p = ∆pmax − φ(∆p) · (1 − φ(∆p))
φ′(∆p)
}
. (29)
Before turning to the proof, let us comment on this proposition. The result shows that
an equilibrium exists if firm A has no incentive to non-locally undercut prices. In fact,
30This implies that πA is not globally concave. It is easy to check that it is neither globally quasi-concave.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. Moreover, the non-concavity of πA is increasing in ∆p (resp. −pA) for
∆p ≤ ∆pmax (resp. pA ≥ pB − ∆pmax).
31Adding more informed consumers always makes the non-quasiconcavity problem less severe since the
demand of informed consumers is linear. Thus, the derived upper bound on cost asymmetries with only
uninformed consumers is sufficient for existence with a positive share of informed consumers.
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the incentive to undercut prices increases in more asymmetric industries or for more loss-
averse consumers. For a low degree of loss aversion (1 < λ < 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.828), an
equilibrium exists if the cost difference between firms is not too large (see (28)).32 In this
case, an equilibrium exists for all values of β. However, if the degree of loss aversion rises
further, equilibria only exist if there is a sufficiently large share of informed consumers
which reduces the undercutting incentive of firm A. This tradeoff is illustrated in Table 1
below.
Table 1: Non-deviation condition
Variation of ∆pnd and ∆cnd in β and λ. (t = 1)
λ = 3 λ = 6 λ = 9
β ∆pnd(λ, β) ∆cnd(λ, β) ∆pnd(λ, β) ∆cnd(λ, β) ∆pnd(λ, β) ∆cnd(λ, β)
0.8 0.648337 1.75869 0.372669 1.07069 0.294726 0.857815
0.6 0.543254 1.45317 0.23824 0.686206 0.150303 0.440498
0.4 0.459237 1.22329 0.107415 0.314749 0.000320 0.000959
0.2 0.377489 1.00993 - - - -
0.0 0.278889 0.75963 - - - -
In the proof we first provide the critical level of ∆c for which the equilibrium condition
in (10) is satisfied for candidate interior equilibria. We next identify the set of candidate
interior equilibria which are robust to local and non-local price deviations of firm A.
Proof of Proposition 10.
1. To find an upper bound on ∆c for which the equilibrium condition (10) is satisfied
we determine the point at which f (∆p; β) is a tangent on the ∆p-line. In Figure 4
this corresponds to an upward shift of the f (∆p; β)-curve.
Tangent condition:
f ′(∆p; β) = 1 ⇔ 3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) = 0 (30)
It is sufficient to consider β = 0 as the most problematic case with respect to ex-
istence. The reason is that for β > 0 there is a positive weight on the demand of
32Note that according to experimental work on loss aversion λ takes the value of approximately 3, which
is within this range.
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informed consumers which is linear. Denote the critical price difference that satis-
fies (30) at β = 0 as ∆pta(λ). We note that it is decreasing in λ.
Then, the equilibrium condition in (10) is fulfilled if and only if ∆c satisfies the
following condition
∆c ≤ ∆cta(λ) ≡ ∆pta(λ) − f (∆pta(λ); 0). (31)
∆cta(λ) is uniquely determined by∆pta(λ), using equilibrium condition (10) because
at the tangent point there is a one-to-one relationship between the two variables.33
2. At this step, we show that a solution to the first-order condition is a local maximizer.
Suppose, by contrast, that, at ∆p = ∆p′, S OCA is not satisfied. Then, at ∆p′, firm
A’s profit takes a minimum and ∆p′ cannot be an equilibrium. Now, define ∆ps(λ)
as the critical price difference which satisfies the second-order condition of firm A
(27) with equality. There is a unique ∆ps(λ) for any given λ because the convexity
of πA is strictly decreasing in pA. Thus, S OCA holds for∆p ≤ ∆ps(λ). We next show
that S OCA implies the tangent condition—i.e., ∆ps(λ) < ∆pta(λ). Rearranging (27)
and (30) leads to
φ
2
≤ (φ
′)2
φ′′
, (27’)
(2φ − 1)
3 ≤
(φ′)2
φ′′
. (30’)
Hence, ∆ps(λ) < ∆pta(λ) holds if and only if φ/2 > (2φ − 1)/3. This inequality is
satisfied for all φ ∈ [1/2, 1].
3. Due to the increasing convexity of πA in −pA a candidate interior equilibria which
locally satisfy S OCA might be ruled out as an equilibrium because a non-local devi-
ation may be profitable. This is the case when the convexity is sufficiently large: A
non-local price decrease becomes a profitable deviation for firm A—an example of
this kind is presented in Figure 5. Given the increasing convexity of πA, the unique
optimal deviation of firm A (if it exists) is characterized by firm A serving the en-
tire market of uninformed consumers—i.e., pdA such that ∆pd = ∆pmax. Decreasing
pdA further is not profitable since firm A does not attract more marginal consumers,
while its profit margin goes down for all inframarginal consumers. Hence, in the
following we will restrict our attention to price deviations by firm A that steal the
33For ∆cu(λ) ≤ ∆c < ∆cta(λ) there might arise two candidate interior equilibria. However as we see next,
the second one does not survive the local S OCA criterion.
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Profit of firm A, πA(pA, p∗B), as a function of its own price pA given pB = p∗B for ∆c = 1
(cA = 0, cB = 1) and parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and λ = 3: p∗A = 1.17309,
pdA = p
∗
B −∆pmax = 0.80863, p∗B = 1.55863, ∆p∗ = 0.385537, and ∆pmax = ∆p˜ = 3/4.
Figure 5: Non-existence
entire demand of uninformed consumers. If deviating is profitable, firm A sets
pdA = p
∗
B − ∆pmax. For β = 0, firm A’s deviation profit πdA is equal to (pdA − cA) · 1
since φ(∆pmax; 0) = 1. Using that pdA = p∗B − ∆pmax we receive
πdA =
(
p∗B − ∆pmax − cA
)
· 1
=
(1 − φ
φ′
+ ∆c − ∆pmax
)
· 1 by FOCB
=
(
∆p∗ +
φ
φ′
− ∆pmax
)
· 1 by (10) (32)
For the candidate interior equilibrium, firm A’s profit is equal to πA(∆p∗) = (p∗A −
cA)φ, which in turn is equal to φ2/φ′ by FOCA.
Thus, a deviation of firm A is not profitable if and only if πA(∆p∗) ≥ πdA. Rearrang-
ing yields
∆p∗ ≤ ∆pmax − φ · (1 − φ)
φ′
. (33)
This is the required non-deviation condition. We define ∆pnd(λ) as the non-trivial
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solution different from ∆pmax to (33) holding with equality. We have
∆pnd(λ) = ∆pmax −
φ(∆pnd(λ); 0) ·
(
1 − φ(∆pnd(λ); 0)
)
φ′(∆pnd(λ); 0) .
Lemma 6 below shows that ∆pnd(λ) is uniquely determined by this non-deviation
condition if the trivial solution, ∆pmax, is excluded. Furthermore, the set of non-
negative ∆pnd(λ) is non-empty for λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2].
Again by using the equilibrium condition (10), an interior equilibria exists if and
only if ∆c ≤ ∆cnd(λ) ≡ ∆pnd(λ) − f (∆pnd(λ)).34
4. Taken together, due to increasing convexity of πA, the non-deviation condition im-
plies local concavity of the firms’ profit function and therefore, as shown above,
the tangent condition. Thus any price difference resulting from a candidate interior
equilibrium which satisfies the non-deviation condition can be supported in equi-
librium, as ∆pnd(λ) < ∆ps(λ) < ∆pta(λ) < ∆pmax(λ). This provides a bound on the
admissible cost asymmetry that is given in the proposition.

Lemma 6. For β = 0 and λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2], ∆pnd(λ) is the unique non-trivial solution
(i.e., ∆p , ∆pmax) to the non-deviation condition in (29),
∆p = ∆pmax − φ(∆p; β) · (1 − φ(∆p; β))
φ′(∆p; β) .
Moreover, ∆pnd(λ) is non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that the non-deviation condition is trivially satisfied at ∆p =
∆pmax since φ(∆pmax; β) = 1 for β = 0 (see Figure 6 below for a graphical illustration of
the non-deviation condition). It can be shown that A(∆p) ≡ ∆p + φ(1 − φ)/φ′ approaches
∆pmax from above for ∆p < ∆pmax. For ∆p ≥ 0 but ∆p being small, A(∆p) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, A(∆p) is continuous and exhibits at most one
maximum for ∆p ∈ [0,∆pmax). Taken together, there exists a unique ∆p ∈ [0,∆pmax) at
34For β > 0 we have to be more careful to have a uniqueness statement. Fix some β > 0. For ∆cu(λ) ≤
∆c < ∆cnd(λ) (where, in an abuse of notation, the latter critical value is adjusted for β), the equilibrium
condition (10) may not make a unique selection—i.e., there might arise a second solution to (10), ∆p∗∗.
This solution can be ruled out because, by construction, ∆p∗∗ is larger than ∆pta(λ) and, hence, larger than
∆pnd(λ). The unique interior equilibrium that survives the non-deviation condition would be selected by
the following existence criterion ∆c < min{∆cnd(λ),∆cu(λ)}.
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which the non-deviation condition is satisfied if and only if, at ∆p = 0, A(∆p) is smaller or
equal than ∆pmax. For β = 0, A(0) = (λ+3)/(4t(λ+1)) and ∆pmax = ∆p˜ = (λ+3)t/(2(λ+
1)). It is easy to check that A(0) ≤ ∆pmax if and only if λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2]. Denoting the
solution to the non-deviation condition by ∆pnd(λ) completes the proof.35 
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∆pnd(λ) ∆pmax
Non-deviation condition of firm A, as a function of the price difference ∆p for ∆c =
0.25 (cA = 0.25, cB = 0.5) and parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and λ = 3: ∆pnd(3) =
0.27889, ∆cnd(3) = (∆pnd(3) − f (∆pnd(3); 0)) = 0.75963, ∆pmax = ∆p˜ = 3/4, and
∆p¯ = 0.83485. Non-deviation for ∆p ≤ ∆pnd(3) = 0.27889.
Figure 6: Non-deviation in asymmetric industries
If the degree of loss aversion becomes sufficiently high (λ > 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.828), the set
of non-negative ∆pnd(λ) becomes empty. Here deviating is profitable even for symmetric
industries (∆c = 0). However, restricting the share of uninformed consumers can reinforce
existence of symmetric equilibria in this case.
To provide a concrete numerical example on equilibrium existence and uniqueness, for
λ = 3, t = 1 and β = 0, the following price differences arise ∆pnd(3) = 0.27889, ∆pu(3) =
0.31072, ∆ps(3) = 0.48259, ∆pta(3) = 0.69532, ∆pmax = ∆p˜ = 0.75, and ∆p¯ = 0.83485.
Moreover, ∆cnd(3) is equal to (∆pnd(3) − f (∆pnd(3); 0)) = 0.75963—i.e., an equilibrium
exists for ∆c < 0.75963. The other critical values are ∆cu(3) = 0.83485, ∆cta(3) =
1.40396, and ∆cni(3) = 1.5. Since ∆cnd(3) < ∆cu(3) the equilibrium is the unique interior
equilibrium. Since ∆cnd(3) < ∆cni(3) there does not exist a non-interior equilibrium. For
35We receive ∆pnd(1 + 2√2) = 0 and, for λ → 1, ∆pnd(λ) → ∆pmax.
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equilibrium values at ∆c = 0.25 and 0.75 see Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix C. An example
for non-existence at β = 0 is provided in Figure 5 with ∆c = 1.
C Tables
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Table 2: Small Cost Differences:
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, cA = 0.25, cB = 0.5:
β p∗A(β) p∗B(β) ∆p∗(β) qA(∆p∗) xˆin(∆p∗) xˆun(∆p∗) π∗A π∗B CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.33333 1.41667 0.0833333 0.541667 0.541667 0.532453 0.586806 0.420139 1.37674 1.37674 1.16648
0.8 1.37274 1.45643 0.0836887 0.539995 0.541844 0.532597 0.606272 0.439961 1.29508 1.33717 1.12672
0.6 1.41524 1.49932 0.0840806 0.538326 0.54204 0.532755 0.627281 0.461361 1.21022 1.29448 1.08382
0.4 1.46121 1.54572 0.0845149 0.536662 0.542257 0.532931 0.650008 0.484522 1.12178 1.24832 1.03742
0.2 1.51103 1.59603 0.0849986 0.535002 0.542499 0.533127 0.674653 0.509652 1.02934 1.19828 0.987112
0.0 1.56518 1.65072 0.0855405 0.533347 0.54277 0.533347 0.701446 0.536986 0.932421 1.14388 0.932421
Table 3: Intermediate Cost Differences
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, cA = 0.25, cB = 1:
Prices of both firms are first increasing and then decreasing in β.
β p∗A(β) p∗B(β) ∆p∗(β) qA(∆p∗) xˆin(∆p∗) xˆun(∆p∗) π∗A π∗B CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.5 1.75 0.25 0.625 0.625 0.605992 0.78125 0.28125 1.14063 1.14063 0.834921
0.8 1.5039 1.758 0.254109 0.62324 0.627054 0.60798 0.781477 0.285586 1.07357 1.13519 0.827071
0.6 1.50553 1.76414 0.25861 0.621651 0.629305 0.61017 0.780502 0.289112 1.00758 1.13188 0.821115
0.4 1.50448 1.76803 0.263546 0.62026 0.631773 0.612585 0.778104 0.29165 0.942908 1.13111 0.81744
0.2 1.50029 1.76925 0.26896 0.619097 0.63448 0.615251 0.774048 0.293008 0.879835 1.13332 0.816464
0.0 1.49248 1.76737 0.274896 0.618194 0.637448 0.618194 0.768092 0.292988 0.818625 1.13897 0.818625
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Table 4: Large Cost Differences:
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, cA = 0.25, cB = 1.25:
Non-existence for β = 0 (see Figure 5). qA(∆p∗) is decreasing in β—i.e., uninformed consumers are easier to attract than informed
consumers. Reason: Due to large price differences loss aversion in price dimension dominates loss aversion in taste dimension.
Uninformed consumers are more willing to buy the less expensive product.
β p∗A(β) p∗B(β) ∆p∗(β) qA(∆p∗) xˆin(∆p∗) xˆun(∆p∗) π∗A π∗B CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.58333 1.91667 0.333333 0.666667 0.666667 0.648371 0.888889 0.222222 1.02778 1.02778 0.673468
0.8 1.5623 1.90417 0.341863 0.66734 0.670931 0.652973 0.875753 0.217615 0.974147 1.04598 0.686806
0.6 1.5361 1.88738 0.351282 0.668631 0.675641 0.658117 0.859926 0.211208 0.923306 1.06911 0.7046
0.4 1.5043 1.86596 0.361666 0.670654 0.680833 0.663868 0.841199 0.202865 0.87537 1.09757 0.727236
0.2 1.46663 1.83971 0.373075 0.673535 0.686538 0.670284 0.819444 0.192519 0.830299 1.13163 0.754968
0.0 - - - - - - - - - - -
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